Deep Partition Aggregation: Provable Defense against General Poisoning Attacks
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Adversarial poisoning attacks distort training data in order to corrupt the test-time behavior of a classifier. A provable defense provides a certificate for each test sample, which is a lower bound on the magnitude of any adversarial distortion of the training set that can corrupt the test sample's classification. We propose two provable defenses against poisoning attacks: (i) Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA), a certified defense against a general poisoning threat model, defined as the insertion or deletion of a bounded number of samples to the training set – by implication, this threat model also includes arbitrary distortions to a bounded number of images and/or labels; and (ii) Semi-Supervised DPA (SS-DPA), a certified defense against label-flipping poisoning attacks. DPA is an ensemble method where base models are trained on partitions of the training set determined by a hash function. DPA is related to subset aggregation, a well-studied ensemble method in classical machine learning. DPA can also be viewed as an extension of randomized ablation (Levine Feizi, 2020a), a certified defense against sparse evasion attacks, to the poisoning domain. Our label-flipping defense, SS-DPA, uses a semi-supervised learning algorithm as its base classifier model: we train each base classifier using the entire unlabeled training set in addition to the labels for a partition. SS-DPA outperforms the existing certified defense for label-flipping attacks (Rosenfeld et al., 2020). SS-DPA certifies >= 50 against 675 label flips (vs. < 200 label flips with the existing defense) on MNIST and 83 label flips on CIFAR-10. Against general poisoning attacks (no prior certified defense), DPA certifies >= 50 poison image insertions on MNIST, and nine insertions on CIFAR-10. These results establish new state-of-the-art provable defenses against poison attacks.
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